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PREFACE.

In writing this thesis I have endeavored, as far as
possible, to gather my material from the original sourceq
both for the historical and the legal portion of the work
This has oecasionaly bjen. impossible or inexpedient.
In such cases I have been driven to the secondary authorities, and have consulted standard works of history, and
text books on the law involved in the ease.
It was at first my purpose to study the sequence
features more thoroughly and in detail ; but the work
has already projected itself many pages beyond my expeetations.

For myself, at least, this research has had

an interest and fascination which arouses a purpose to
continueat a future day, this most interesting of studE.F.S.

ios.

Cornell University,
Ithaca, N, Y.

May, 1894.
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In

dust

aim

the history of trials,

pages of law re )orts,

es of intellect an'"' wit,

tr

from o)t t he dr,

are occasifflal

e re

aal

flash-

i-,ursts of iorensic eloqaelnice

to
an& oratory, that. cause evexn the word-a-Fay law'e1
In all the history
with admairation.
pause, and thrill
o2 our law there are but few such causes.
which surpasses all others,
prdence had an equal,

and has not in English Juris-

since the trial
It

is that of' Dartmouth Colleg-e.
principle of constitutional law,

sucl

names as "-son,

made

it

The case

involved a vital

and the prestige of

Story,

Webster,

of ,Wzrren Yastings,

and :a-'B.all have

a landmark among trials.

71or more than half a century the case slumbered in
the time-stained parses of the United

In the subsequent cases which arose,
the doctrine,
4 Wheaton,

.tartes Law Reports.
as the sequence of

there are occasional references to

citing the rule there established as law.

These are mere sparks of lir ht
which show that the case is

scatteredx here and there,

not entirely lost in

ion ; but they are few and far apart.

obliv-

The cloua that

2
hmng over a dark spot remained unbroken, and the secrets
of a great case sliumbered in faded letters,and

in musty

raniisripts.
In 1879

r.

Jonh M. Shirley publishe,. a volume deIt

nominated 'The College Causes".
of the suits In which the little
was involved,

contained a report

New Hampshire college

some of the personal correspondence of the
and valuable cOl-

principal participants

in the case,

lections of well-nigh

forgotten mterial.

The work

has been criticised as bungling, and unsystematic.
This Is d(mbtless true.
The anthor boggles and stumbles
often ; but he was working in the dark,

and in an unex-

plored territory.

When properly sifted and arranged,

his work throws

a flood of li.,ht on a heretofore dark spot,
Dartmouth Colle
new sunshine.

Case

is

and the

made luminous by a burst of

e has rescued from the limbo of histori-

cal rubbish a most faseinting

incident,

ded the macnet lin and 'attra'.tiveness

political history.

to which

is

ad-

of' pe.rsonal and

From the publication of this book,

the Dartmouth Col leze Case has sudIdenly sprung into
prominence.
is

No life of Webster

or of Jeremiah Mason

complete without a special chapter on this now wonder-

3

The law periodicals, and the magazines teerr

ful case.

with accounts of it.

Staid and sedate judges review

the case, accept a long settled precedent, or condemn

with mild praise.

In ny brief research I have s'ound

articles both praising and condemning the final decision.
There are essays and conentarios on the case in the
Legl Gazette, Amer.ican Law Review, American Bar AssociaThese

tion, Harvard Law Review, aria Albany Law Journal.
articles have all had their rise in the past ten or

twelve years.
The cause arose in the bitterness of a vli'gious

controversy.

It was fostered by sectarianism for a

generation ; anrx

was handed from father to son, and from

master to pupil.

Its sponsor on the one hand was Liber-

alism, and on the other

Conservatism.

ism against the Church.
ties, ant

It was Jacobin-

It easily drifted into poli-

ederalismi and Democracy faced each other on

a new issue.

A fierce political campaign,Fan ephemeral

rise of the triumphant Democrats, an unsumrnry dismissal
of some college officials,

and the affair was brought

before the New J-arpshire court for adjudi0at ion.
us now lookbriefly into
this case.

Let

the details of the origin of

4

CHAPTER I.
ORIGIN OF TYE CASE.

In tlh

early days of Dartmouth College, Mr. Eleazer

Wheelock, the founder o-

the college,

had rmuch religious

controversy with Dr. Bellamy of Coiuiecticut,

Wheelock was a Presbyteolsan

himself a graduate of Yale.
and a liberal.

who was like

bellamy was a Congregationalist and
charter the college was free

strictly orthodox.

By t he

from any religious

discrimination.

But by will Wheelock

provided that his son should succeed him as president
of Dartmouth College.
In 1793 Judge 4iles, a pupil of Bellamy, became a
trustee of the college, and h

an

John Wheelock repre-

sented the opposite views which they had respectively
inherited from tutor and father.

They were f1ormed

for mutual hostility, ana the contest began Some twelve

years before it

reached the publi.

presiLdent were then all Federalists,

The trustees and
and there was no

o ifierence either of' a political, or of a religious
nature.

The trouble arose from a resistance of a minOri-

5
ty of the trustees to what they termed the Family Dynasty
Wheelock nintained his aseendency until 1809,
enemies obtained a majority in

when his

the board of trustees,

and thereafter admitted no friend of the president to
and used every

the government,

effort to subdue the

dominant dynasty.
At thds period the Federalists were the ruling party
in

New Hampshire,

state church.
Federalists,
same party.

and the Congregationalists

The Congregational ministers were firm
and most of their parishioners were of the
Dartmouth College was therefore one of the

Federal and Congregational

strongholds.

hopeless and bitter confliot ensued.
finally in
public
der,

formed the

Some -year- of

The Wheel'ock party

1815 br ought thelr grievances before the

in an elaborate

p'amphlet.

This led to a rejoin-

and a war of pmphlets ensued, creating a great

sensation and profound interest.
plated legal prooeedings.

wont to Mr.

Wheelock now contem-

The president,

therefore,

Webster and consulted him professionally,

paid him a fee,

and obtained a promise of future services.

About the t ime of the consultation Wheelock sent a memorial to the legislature charging the trustees with

misap-

6
plication of trie funds, and various breaches of tr.ist,
religious intolerance, and a violation of the

olmrter

in their attacks upon the presidential office, and prayed
for a comittee of investi ;ation.

The trustees met him

boldly and offered stury resistance, denying all the
chart;es, and especially that off reliiou3 intolerance
but
ty.

the cortnittee was.oiven by the vote of a large ,Mjori-When W-heelock heard that

the coinittee had been

voted and was to have a hearing, he wrote
and asked him to appear before them.

to U'r.Webster

But Mr.Webster

did not come, and Wheelock went on without him.

Webster

was much criticised for his i'ailure to appear before the
coranittee, but excused

ijmuelf with the reply;,

that he

did not regwrd a surinons to appear beCore a legislative

corrmittee a professional call, and that he was by no
means sure that the president was in the ritjt.
Mowever, the truth seems to be that most of Mr.Webster's personal and political friends were either trustees themselves, or were Closely ai8:ociated with him in
the control of the Federal party.

Dun-ing the interval

between the consult at ion wi th Wheelock and the coinnittee
hearing, these friends and leaders saw Mor.

Webster,

and

7
pointed out to him that he must not desert them,

as this

college controversy was rapidly developing into a party
Mr.

question.
left

Webster was accordingly convinced,

Vheelock in

the lurch making,

as has been seen,

very unsatisfactory explanation of his concuct.
irrevocably enga .ed

thereafter

tees, and in

and
a

He was

on the side of the trus-

him they had won their most

powerful ally.

But events took a sharp turn now and moved wi th
spirit.

Without heeding the advice of their eminent

counsel,

Ir.

Jeremiah liason,

the trustees at once re-

moved Wheelock from the presidency,
place Rev.

Francis Brown,

and appointed in

At such defiance

his

of the

legislative committee the spark of" popular excitement
burst into a blaze.of wrath,

and the whole question

was at once thrown into politics.
As Mr. Mason had foreseen,
trustees against hasty action,

when he had warned the
all members of every

oth-

er sect except the Congramtionalists and cll the other
liberal element

were united against the trustees,

therelfore against the Federalists.
Federalist,

went over

porters with him.

Wheelock,

and

who was a

to the opposition taking his sup-

When the election came on,

Mr.Plumer,

8

with him a Democratic

The position of

legislature.

Efforts were mde

the trustees was now precarious.
sooth the now rarpant Demcorats.

The 7,overnor in

virtually to place it

and in

reorganize

June the
and

the college,

within the control of the state.
The old board

Both boards of trustees assembled.
turned out Judge Woodward,
friend of Wheelock,

the struggle

but

his message to the legis-

lature declared against the trustees,
legislature passed an act to

to

It was noised about

that a ncv college was to be foumded,
was in vain.

and

was elected governor,

the Democratic candidate,

who was a

their sec1etary,

and secretary also of

the new board.

He resolved to fight having received money to carry it
President

on from a friend.

surnons of the new trustees,
by resolution.

Brown refused to obey

who expelled the old board

Thereupon the old board brought

against Woodward for the college seal and other
and the case came on for trial

the

in

M,[ay,

1817.

sAit
property,

The writ

was sued out on Februray 8 and the declaration was trover

ir. M[ason and .Tudge

Smith appeared for the college,

while

George Sullivan and Ichabod Bartlett for Woodward and the
state board.

The case was argued,

and went over to the

9

September term of the same year,
were joined by Mr.

(1)

wi-ig

MNason and Smith

Webster.)

Dartmouth College Causes, by Shirley. Curtis'
Life of Webster. Lodge's Life of Webster.
Private Correspondenee of Webster by T letcher
Webster.
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CHAPTER I I.
THE TECHNIQUE OF THE CASE.

In the "College Causes" Mr.

Shirley enumerates some

five distinct cases that were before tke courts during
this

Four of these were

rather prolonged ccntroversy.

to test

the validity of the act of the New Hampshire

legislature of June,

1816,--

and

the charter,

"to amend

enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College",
and the supplementary act of December 18 and 26 of

the

same year.
The principal changes made in the charter by the

acts of the New Hampshire legislature on June 27,

1816

and December 16 and 26 of the same year were :
(1)

The name is

changed to "The Trustees of Dart-

mouth University."

(2) The nunber of trustees is
to twenty-one,

quorum.

a majority of whom shatll

constitute

a

The nine new trustees are to be appointed by

the governor and his

(I)

increased from twelve

counsel.

1

The act of Pecember 16 repealed that part of
mde a majority of the
trustees necessary to constitute a quoru, and
the act of June 27 which

made nine trustees a quoru

instead.

11
(3)

The trustees shall have power to organize col-

leges in the university, and to establish an institute
and elect fellows and members thereof.
(4)

A board of overseers,

twenty-five in number,

is created ; the ,-!abers to be appointed by the governor
an&

counsel.

The overseers are to have power to dis-

approve and negative votes of the trustees relative to
the appointment and removal of the president,

professors,

and officers ; relative to salaries ; and also relative
to the establishment of colle6es and

professorahips,

and othe erection of new college buildings.
(5) IEach of the two boards of trustees md overseers shall have power to suspend and remove any member
of their respective boards.
Dr. Eleazer Wheelock applied to the crown for a
charter, and the king in 1769, granted the eharter of
Dartmouth eollere.

The chartcr of the above date recites

in substance as follows
That there shall be a college erected in New H-ampshire, Dartmouth %ollege by name for the education of
Incian and English youth ; and that there shall be in
said college "from henceforth and forever" a body corpoF-

12
ate

and politic,

consisting of trustees of said college,

*the whole number of said trustees consisting,
after forever to consist
charter expresses

and here-

of twelve and no more.'

The

the intent thrat the corporation shall

have perpetual succession and continuance forever.

It

also appoints Dr. Wheelock and eleven other persons as
From the preamble

trustees.

not less than six of

it

is

to be presumed that

the eleven were the samne persons

who had already been named as trustees by Dr. Wheelook
in his will.

Seven trustees constitute a quorum.

board of trustees fill
The usual corporate

vacancies

in their own number.

privileges and powers are conferred

upon the trustees and their successors forever.
charter

styles Dr.

The

The

Woodward the "Founder of the College*,

and appoints him president.
The law amending
was passed in December,

the charter of Dartmouth College
1817.

sage in the New Hampshire

At the time of its

legislature,

pas-

a protest was

entered upon the records of the house by those who had
opposed it,
tract,
control.

upon the ground that the Charter was a con-

and therefore beyond the reach of legislative
This is

said to be the first instance on rec-

13
ord where the "contract theory" in rejard to a corporate
invoked under our constitution, and

franchise was ever

then only as a matter of justice, and not of constitutional right.
The

suits in which the college was

different

volved during this extended litiration
(1)
Woodward.
etc.

were

Trustees of DJartmouth College v.
Action,--

trespass

in-

I.

Will ism

on the case for

converting

divers books anu records.
(2)

.;3,000.

IHatch v, Lang.

Action,-- in

This wa6 al so carried to

for

eject~..ent

the Supreme Court of

the United States.
(6)

Pierce v. Gilbert.

Action,-- ojectment ; dama-

ges claimed 02,000.
(4)

arsh v.

Allen,

Action,-- ejectment
(5)
, ,O00

executor of John Wheelock.

; daina-es claimed

Allen v. Dartmouth College.

,00.
Action,-- assumpsit

claimed for services as president

o

the college.

We r.e concerned in this article only with trio case of'
Trustees of iartrnouth College
in

the lower court in

I

:ew H

v.

phr

V'oodward,
eors

in the United States court in 4 Wheaton.

reported
l

n

The quest ion

14
:

as presented in this case to the court was
Did the Constitution under the clause,
shall . .

.

pass any .

..

gation of contract',

.

.

.

"No state

law irparing the obli-

establish the doctrine

charter granted by the state legislature

that every

is

a contract,

and as such irrevocable by act of the legislature ?
The action was comr.enced at
please,

Grafton County,

the court

February term,

of common

1817.

The wri t

was sued out on the 8th and served on the 10th of

same month.

The d eclaration was trover

the

for the books

of record purporting to contain the records of all the
doings and proceedings

of the trustees of Dartmouth Col-

lege from the organization of the corporation until the

7th of October,
nal letters

of

1816 of the value of $,5,000,-- the origi-

patent constitutinfg the college,

l0,000,-- the comnon seal,

and four volumes

of the value of $1,000,--

or books of accounts purporting to

contain the charges and accounts
of the value of

l0,000.

in favor

damages are laict at

of the collegef

The conversion is

have been ode on the 7th of October,

Note.--

of the value

1816.

alleged to
Plaintiff's

50,00O.

In the act of December 26,

1816,

a fine of

$500 was imposed upon any rran 'who shall di-

15
We now turn to the managemmt and argumnt of the
case before the New Hampshire tribunal.

rectly or indlirectly wilfully impede or hinder
any officer or officers . . . in the free and entire
discharge of tile autie8 of tuieir respective
offices.

16
CHAPTER III.
IN THE NEW HAMPSHIRE COURT.

In a previous
first

chapter it

was shown,

that

in

the

argument of the case the interests of the college

were left with Jeremiah Mason and Judge Smith,
later by Mr.

Webster,

while Mr.

were Sullivan and Bartlett.
trial

was Mr.

effort,--

Woodward's attorneys

The sensation of

Webster's speech,--

which was later used,

assisted

the second

a brilliant rhetorical

in modified form,

so ef

fectively before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The argument of the case,and the opinion of Judge

Richardson is given in 1 New Hampshire,

ill.

The opinion

is vigorous and hostile, and is against the college.

It

holds that*-(1) The corporation of Dartmouth College is a public
corporation.

(The opposite of this is set forth in the

court above by Chief-Justice

(2)

Marshall.)

An act of the legislature,

adding new members

to the corporation, without the consent of the old corporation, is

not repugnant to the constitution of this

state.
T lie

charter

of the king,

creating the corpora-

17
tion of Dartmouth College,
meaning of

not a contract within the

is

that clause of the constitution of the United

States which prohibits states from

passing laws impair-

ing the obligation of contracts.
In
it

proceeding to the opinion the court states,

has witnessed a display of learning,

talent,

that

and

eloquence that is highly complinentary to the legal profession of the state.
tiff's

That

counsel to convince

of their position is
in research,

the failure

of the plain-

the bench of the correctness

not owing to any want of diligence

or ingenuity

in

reasoning ; but to a want

of solid and substantial grounds on which to rest

their

arguments.
The court
college is

a public

were exercised
is

a public

then proceeds to point out',
corporation,

since its

for public purposes,

corporation in

that the
franchises

Darmouth College

the same manner in which a

bank would be a corporation,

all the shares of the company.

if

the state should purchase

So also if the legisla-

ture should incorporate a number of individuals for the
purpose of making a canal, and should reserve all the
profit arising from it

to the state, even though all

the

18
fur 1s might be given to the corporation by individuals,
it

would in

fact be a public

corporat ion,

these cases the property and franchise
would in fact be public property.
a corporation

In

both

of the corporation

Therefore,

a gift to

created for public purposes is,

in realitX

a gift to the public.
But if,
incorporate
corporators,

on the other hand,

the legislature

should

a banking company for the benefit oi' the
and should give the corporators all the ne-

cessary funds,

it

would be a private corporation ; be-

cause a gift to such a corporation would be only a gift
to the corporators.
poration is

Thus it

seems that whether a cor-

to be considered as public or private de-

pends upon the objects for which its

franchises are to be

exercised.
The court

then proceeds,

to state whether

that

it

is

not necessary

an incorporated college,

endowed by an individual,

founded and

who had reserved to himself a

control over its affairs as a private visitor, is
private or a public corporation, since

it

a

does not ap-

pear that Dartmouth College was subject to any private
visitat ion whatever.

Bow much different is

the view of

19
this situation taken by Chief-Justice Marshall will be
turn to the reports of the case in the

seen when we
Federal Court.

The wording of the charter of the college itself

tends to the conclusion that the college is a public
corporation,

since its purpose was to "spread the knowl-

edge of the great Redeemer'
furnish 'the

and to

best means of education" to the youth of

New Hampshire.

These purposes must certainly be mattes

of public concern.

Tor who has any private interest

either in the objects,
tion ?

among the savages,

or the property of this institu-

The office of trustee of Dartmouth College is

in fact a public trust as much as is

the office of

governor, or of judge of this court ; and for any breach
of this trust the state has the unquestionable

right

through its courts of justice to hail them, and call
then to account.
One of the statutes of New Hampshire, passed December 11, 1812 (New Hampshire Laws, 184) makes the
and interests of any person,

shares

in any incorporated company,

liable to be seized and sold on execution,

and gives

to

the purchaser all the privileges appertaining thereto.
It

makes him therefore a member of the corporation.

But

20
the thought probably never occurred to any man that when
a new member is
tion is

added by virtue of an act,

the corpora-

thereby dissolved and a new one created.

Yet

that act has at least as much dissolving and as much
creating force as the act now under consideration.
AS to the question of contract
ment for the plaintiff

is

this :

A

the gist of the argustatute which at-

tempts to compel the members of a corporation to become
members of that corporation differently organized,
out their consent

is

invalid.

propositions are true*,
are true,
them is
There is
pel

"Neither

says the court,

with-

of these

"and if

they

the legitimate conclusion to be drawn from

wholly irrelevant to the question in the case'.
no doubt of' the power in the legislature

'individuals

mouth College,

to accept

to com-

the office of trustee of Dart-

however the corporation may be

organized,

any more than there is doubt of the rigpht of the leislature to compel

or to be

individuals

-to serve as town officers,

enrolled in the militia,

municipal corporation,

or to be members of a

as of a city or township.

principal .is as old as the Bill of Rights,
fundamental principle of all governments,

This

and is a
that the Btate
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has a paramount right to the personal services of its
citizens.
If the charter of a public institution, like that
of Dartmouth College,

is

to be construed as a contract

within the intent of the constitution of the United
States,

it

will be difficult to say what powers in rela-

tion to their public institutions,
the states.

It

is

if

any,

are left to

a construction repugnant to every

principle of good goverrment,

because it

places all the

public institutions of that state beyond legislative control.

For it

is

on the subject.

clear that Congress possesses no power
It

is clear therefore that

of Dartmouth College is

the charter

not a contract within tk

reraning

of this clause of the constitution of the United StateS.
But supposing it
Is

it

is

a contract,

how can it

be construed ?

a contract on the part of the king with,.the cor-

porators, whom he appointed,

and their successors that

they should be forever free from all legislative
ference,

inter-

and that their number should not be augmented

or diminished however strongly public interest mig~ht
quire

it

?

Such a contract would be absurd, and repug-

nant to the principles of' all

Note.--

re-

The king has

government.

In the argumnt before the

Ne

Iamshr

2i)
no power to make such a contract,

neither

has the le-is-

lature.

court MA*r. Jeremiah M.ason arranged his brief under
three heads.-(1) The act is not within the general scope of
legislative power.
(2) It is in conflict with the constitution of
New Iampshire restraining legislative power.
incompatible with the clause of the
(3) It is
Constitution of the United States which forbids
states to pass laws impairing the obligation of
contracts.
The case went to the United States Supreme Court
This feature of
on the single point of contract.
raised by a layman, was conthe question was first
sidered of no value by lawyers, and received but

slight attention at the hands of Mr.

Mason in his

And yet
argimvent before the New Hampshire court.
in the court above it was sufficient to win the case

CHAPTER IV.
EFTORE TIE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL.

It

was a dramatic moment

New Hampshire lawyer,
to present his case.

when he

in

the life

of the young

stood before

the court

ie had mastered the argument

ema-

nating from the keen and penetrating mincts of Jeremiah
Mason and Judge Smith.
Fe was in possession of the
facts of the case,
of every point.

and the legal and political bearing
He knew the judges upon the bench,

their political history, their hopes, their ambitions

their political passions,

caprices,

and prejudices.

To all this was added the magnetic personality of one

of the great orators of history.
As the argument of the case proceeded,
of the New Fampshire lawyer became apparent.

the genius
He dwelt

with great force and strength upon the legal and constitutional argutments advanced by Mason and Smith in the
court below.

He frankly acknowledged himself a eom-

piler of the argument,

anca stated that

furnished by Smith and Mason,

and that

the material was
he had clumsily
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But

put it together.

this putting together,

lation meant much when it
was

r.

Webster.

this compi-

was done by such a master as

A high cast of mind that knows how to

judiciously take and use the work of other men is
but this was his,

rare,

and he did the work with consummate

skill.
He finally turned to the political features oii the
question.

So delicately,

with such art did he turn to

this aspect of the question,

that

even

the great

seemed apparently unconscious,

that he was

beyond the realm of mere legal

logic and reason,

straying

the field of political passion and prejudice.
ed the prosperity

of this little

college,

They had sought to wreck

republic,

it

new revolution.

He pictur-

Then it

Now it was invaded by Jacobins

and Freethinkers.
to involve

into

under the wise

administration of Federalism and the Church.
was strong and vigorous.

court

in European wars,

the young

to engender a

Now they were raising their sacrileg-

ious hands against the temples of lear-ning.
As the strain of this resistless and solemn eloquerce
flowed on,

the

Chief-.Justice was thrilled by its

tive yet mightappeal.

plain-

A paean of war was chanted in

his ear

.

He was carried back to the early days of the

century, when, in the flush of young manhood, at the
head of his court, he had faced the triumphant Deriocrats.
Then he had preserved the

ark of the constitution, had
Then he had

saved the last bulwark of soumd government.

seen the turbulent waves of threatened revolution and
anarchy breaking harmlessly at

is feet.

Then he had

held at bay the maddened frenzy instigated by Genet and
the bloodhouMds of the French Revolution.

Should de-

Democracy further intrench upon the constitution ?
Should the shrines of learning be defiled by rampant
Jacobinites and Freethinkers ?

Should the unity Of.

these states be further threatened ?

was once more on.
Democracy.

The joy of battle

Again it was Federal ismagainst

Again it was Marshall against

Jefferson ;

again the Chief-Justice against the President.

He

grasped anew his weapons, and with all the force of an
imperious will prepared to raise yet another constitu-

tional barrier across the path of his ancient enemies.
The st rain of resistless and solemn eloquence flowed on.
When ?Ir. Webster hact apparently finished,
silent before the cournt for some moment8.

he stood

Then drawing
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himself

up to his full height,

assuming that imperious,

regal air which was as native to him as to a wild stag,
he proceeded,,--a

"This,

sir,

is my case.

It is the case not merely
it

of that humble institution,
lege in our land
little

.

institution

I know it

is

.

.

.

; it

.

is

is

the case of every co l-

Sir, you may destroy this

.

weak ; it

is

in

one of the lesser lights in

horizon of our country.

yor hands

the literary

You may put it out.

you do so you must carry through your work.

But if
You must

extinguish one after another all those greater lights
of science which for more than a century have thrown
their radiance over our land.

It

is,

sir,

as I have

And yet there are those who

said, a sll college.
love it."

Here his feelings mastered him.
with tears,
ceed.

His eyes filled

and for some momenta he was unable to pro-.

In a moment he had regained his composure.
*Sir',

said he in that deep tone with which he

thrilled his hearers,

"I

know not how others may feel

(glancing at the opponents
but for myself,
Caesar in

of the college before him),

when I see my Alma Mater surrounded,

the Senate-House,

by those who are reiterating

like
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stab after stab,
her turn to me,

I would not,
and say

'and

thou too,

Great

Webster's part.

the moment at least,
speaking.

It

Mr, Goodrich,

felt

have

my son

This burst of feeling was perfetly
tr.

hand,

for this rigt

genuine on

orator that

he was,

he,

for

profoundly the words he was

no doubt lad its influence on the court.
an eye witness of the

trial,

has left us an

e says that Chief-Justice MArshall's

account of it.

eyes were suffused with tears, and that the countenance
of Mr. Justice Wahington w-::s as pale and livid as marble

The other members of the court were also deeply moved,
while the entire audience seemed spell-bound.
such a master

effort,

the speeches of

After

the opposing coun-

sel seemed cheap and ineffective.
Chief-Justice
the argmentthat

iarshall announced at the close of
the judges coula not come to any agree-

ment.

There was at that

against

the college.

time cioubtless a majority

During the vacation which followe

there was some very effective log-roA in; done by ?~r.Web-.
ster and Mr.

Mason aided by their associates.

Supple-

m ental briefs were sent to certain members of the bench,
and as studiously withheld from others.

Chancellor Kent

h r.

was quietly influenced to take in
Livingston arnd Mr.

tice Story of

Just ice

>'.

r'.,Ts-

; the work of

Johnson

assachusetts was by no means ineffective.

Such a thing wulcL scarcely be attempted at
this case t. .e

but-in

Justice

tids time,

whole matter was as carefully and

astutely managed as a political cFnpaign.
In

the

interim- preparation

was made by

the defend-

Pinkney,

at that

ants for a rehearing of the cFse.

M-r.

time probably the ablest lawyer in

the United States,

was retained,
tle

use.

ants,

but at this late stage he could be of lit-

The case was practically lost

to

the defend-

and the retention of eminent comsel was vain.

Already had the rains descended,
and had beaten upon this case

and the floods come,

; and it

the opening of the terra of" court

in

At

had fallen.

the following October,

a rehearing of the case was moved by Mr. Pinkney,

wut

Chief-Just ice MIarshall and.ounced that during the vacation
He then proceeded

the judges had cotte to an agreement.
to read one of his great opinions,

in

which he held the

charter of Dartmouth College to be a contract,

and there-

Note.--In this chapter, 1 make no effort to justify
Mason or Webster or their associates in th eir conI sn simpduct during the managenp~t of "this case.
ly concerned in setting forth the facts as I have
found then to be.
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fore irreparable by state laws.
The Chief-Justice

speaks of thi
e caution and cir-

cumspection with which the court approaches a case which
calls in question the validity of an act of a state
He says that in

legislature.
court

take upon itself

the tasi

no doubtful case will the
of derlaring a legisla-

tive act contrary to the const itution.

But the American

People have said in the Constitution of the United Stateg
'"No state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of
contracts,

and in

the same instrument they have declared

that the judicial power 8hall extend to all
and equity arising under the Constitution."
therefore has a duty

imposed upon it

eases in

law

The court

from which it

dare

not shrink.
The heads unit er which the opinion is
(1)

Is

set forth are

this contract protected by the Constitution

of the United States ?
(2)

Is

it

impaired by the acts under which the de-

fIendant holds ?
He first

shows what species of contracts are in-

cluoed in the constitutional

prohibition of the state

laws impairing the obligation of contracts,

and points

:
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the

out the fallacy of extending to the word contract
broadest possible meaning.

Thus this section of the

Constitution w;.s never intended to extend to other contracts than those which respect property,

and confer rights which may be asserted in

of value,
court.
ture,

or some object

It

not intended to restrict

was

for example,

a

the legisla-

on the subject of divorce.

Next he takes up and discusses through several

pages the proposition that Dartmouth College is a private,

eleemosynary corporation,

from the fact that the

funds given by the original grantor were the sources of
payment of instructor's salaries,

and these salaries

lessened the expense of education to students.
then an eleemosynary
its

funds,

is

institution, and so far as respects

a private corporation.

This is

in

contrast with the opinion of the court below.
next place

It

sharp
In

the

the court takes up the proposition that the

charter of Dartmouth College

is

a contract,

the obliga-

tion of which c 3nnot be impaired by a state law.

The donors of the original grants, even if
could be found,

they

have now no interest in the property,

and are therefore unaffected by any change that nay be
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made by the legislature

in

founders do not complain,
benefit it

was founded,

charter.

the college charter.

neither do the youth for whose

of the changes made in the

Does this ease therefore come under the
'Contracts,

constitution ?

the parties to which have

a vested, beneficial interest,
been said,
tion is

These

and those only," it

has

'are the objects about which the constitu-

solicitous, and to which its protection is ex-

tended',

According to the theory of the British Consti-

tution their Parliament

e omnipotent.

To annul oorpor-

ate rights might give a shook to public opinion.
Parliament had,

at the emanation of the charter,

the Instrument, -t,-the

would have had no right

in the property,

have any private,

it

ii

beneficial,

The donors

neither would

the students have had rights to be violated,

and in law,

annuiled

Yet then, as now,

the same situation and state of facts exist.

est in the property.

the

perfidy of this action would have

been almost universally acknowledged.

trustees

If

nor the

individual

Therefore in reason, in

now what it was in 1769.

inter-

Justice,

This char-

ter is then a contract ; the donors, the trustees, and
the crown were the original parties.
It

is

a eontract made on a valuable consideration,
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for the security and disposition of property,
conveyance

of real and personal

estate.

within the letter and the spirit
unless the fact that
donors in

It

for the
is

a contract

of the Constitution,

the property is

invested by the

trustees for the prorrotion of religious and

educational ends,

for the benefit of persons who are

continually changing,

though the object renrains the same,

shall create a particular exception taking this case
out of the prohibition contained in the constitution.
The court next proceeds to show theft the act of the
New Hampshire legislature of June 27, and Deeember 13
and 26,

1816,

impaired the obligation of the charter of

Dartmouth College.

It

is

too clear to require argunent,

that all rights respecting property rerrain unchanged by
the Revolution.

The obligation in the new were there-

fore the same as in the old government.

The power ofthe

g9vernment was therefore the same.
The next point touched ulvn by the court is-, that
the trustees of Dartmouth College have a beneficial
interest therein, because thle charter provides,
ease of a vacancy in that office,

that in

"the senior professor

or tutor, being one of the trustees, shall exercise the
office of president, until the trustees shall rmke choice
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of and appoint a president,
that it

But the court

is unneoessary to elaborate

opinion on general

principles,

that

later says

this point,

being of

in these private,

the body corporate possesses

eleemosynary institutions,

the whole legal and equitable

interest,

and completely

represents the donors for the purpose of executing the
trust.

So the body corporate has rights which are

protected by the constitution.
Mr.

Justice Washington

concurs in

an opinion of

L

considerable length extending over some eleven pages.
Mr.

Justice

Johnson

Chief-Justice

concurred for reasons given by the

; while Mr.

Justice Livingston eoncurred

for reasons stated by the Chief-Justice,
Washington and Story.

Mr.

Just ioe Story concurs in an

elaborate opinion of nearly fifty
while Mr.

and Justices

pages in length

;

Justice Duvall dissented without opinion.

34

CHAPTER V.
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
Their Provisions for Revoking a Corporate Franehise.

No sooner was the decision in the Dartmouth College
case rendered,

than we perceive a reaction setting in

from many directions,
just rule,

It

to circumvent what seemed an un-

was feared that this decision tolled the

death knell of state sovereignty,
for state suicide.
could now,

and laid a precedent

Corporations under their charters

without fear of state interference,

and gather to themselves doninion and power.

reach out,
The inde-

pendence conferred upon these corporations was such as
the East India Company in its

palmiest days never posses-

sed, nor ever aspired to attain,
of corporations.

It was a Magna Charta

We turn now to the state constitu-

tions in their amendments and revisions,

and first come

upon this determination to be rid of a cumbersome and
laborious rule.
Judge Cooley in his Constitutional Law points out
that where,

by the charter the legislature reserves the

right to alter, amend,

or repeal it,

it

is

plain that no
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interferenee

with vested rights can follow ; because

then an alteration, amendment or repeal is in accordance
with the contract, and not hostile to it.

So if the

constitution of the state, or by its general laws in
force when the charter was granted, it is provided that
all charters shall be subject to legislative control and
alteration, this provision in legal effect becomes a
part of the charter, and therefore a part of the contract
Let us now turn to the subject of the reservation
of power by the state to revoke a corporate franshise
as laid down in the different state constitutions,
(1)Constitution of Alabama, 1875. Art. XIII, Sec.3 & 10

says,..--

*The general assembly shall not remit the for-

feiture of the charter of any corporation now existing,
or alter or amend the same, or pass any general or
special law for the benefit of such corporation,
than in

other

execution of a trust enacted by law or by con-

tract, except upon the conlition that such corporation
shall thereafter hold its charter subject to the pro-

visions of this constittut ion.
"The general assembly shall have the power to alter,
revoke or amend any charter of incorporation

now exist-
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ing, and revocable at the ratification
tution,
in

or any that may hereafter

their opinion it

the state,

of this constibe created whenever

may be injurious

in such manner,

hiowever,

shall be done to the corporators.
enacted shall create,

renew

to the citizens of
that no injustice
No law hereafter

or extend the clhrter of

more than one corporation,"

(2)

Constitution of New York,

of Corporations says, --

'.

.

a

.All

1846. Art.VIII,Sec.l
general laws and

special acts passed pursuant to this section may be
altered from time to tine or repealed."
(3)

Constitution of Arkansas,

1874.

Art.XII,Sec.6,

*Corporations may be founded under beneral laws, which
laws may from time to
The general

time be altered or repealed.

assembly shall have the power to alter,

re-

voke or annul any charter of incorporation now existing,
and revocable at

the adoption of this constitution,

any that may hereafter be created,
opinion it

may be injurious

in such manner,

however,

whenever

or

in their

to the citizens oI

the state;

that no injustice sh~±l be

done to the corporators."
(4) Constitution of California,1879.

Art.XII,

Sec.

3
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"Corporations may be formed under 7eneral lass but

shall

All laws no in force

not be created by special act.

in this state concerning corporations, and all laws that
may be hereafter passed pursuant to this section,

nay be

altered from time to time or repealed."
(5) Constitation of Colorado,1876. Art.XV, Sec.S,
"The general assembly shall have power to alter, revoke,
or annul any charter of a corporation now existing and
revocable at the adoption of this constitution, or any
that may hereafter be created, whenever in their opinion
it may be injurious to the citizens of the state ; in
such nanner, however, that no injustice shall be done to
the corporators.
(6) Constitution of Connecticut,1818. Art.X,Sec.3,
"The rigfhts and duties of all corporat ion8 shall rem.4in
as if

this constitution Ind not been mdopted ; with the

exception of such regulations and restrictions as are
contained in
(7)

this constitution."

Constitution of Delaware,18$.Amendrnent

fied January 28,

i875. Art.I,

Sec.17,

shall have power to enact a general
to provide for

"The

rati-

legislature

incorporation act

incorporation of religious, charitable

and manufacturing

purposes

;

.

.

.

. and no attempt slftll
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be made in such act or otherwise, to limit or qualify
the power of revocation reserved to the legislature in
this section'.
(8) Constitution of Florida,1868. Art.XVII,Sec.24,
*The property of all corporations, whether heretofore or
hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation,
unless such corporatio :be for religious, eduoationml,
or charitable purposes".

This is all there is on the

subJ ec t of corporkt iors in the Const itution of Flor ida,

but it was amended in 1875 so as to read,-- "Unless
property be held an

such

used exclusively for religious,

educational, or charitable purposes'.
(9) Constitution of Georgia,1868. On the question
of the revocation of a corporate franchise the Constitution of Georria is silent.

It prohibits the granting

of corporate powers to private companies except to banking, insurance, railroad, canal, naviat ion, mining,
express, lumber manufacturing, and telegraph companies.
(10) Constitution of Illinois,1870, Art.II, Sec.15,

"The general assembly shall pass laws to correct abuses,
and prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the
rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different
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railroads in

the state, and enforce

penalties to the extent
of forfeiture

if

such laws by adequate

necessary

for that purpose,

of their property and franchises,"

(11) Constitution of Indiana,1851.
tion of Indiana is

The constitu-

silent on the general subject of the

revocation of - corport:te franchise,
of municipal corporations.

Art.

except in

XVI,

Sec.

the case

4 provides,-

*All acts of corporation for municipal purposes shall
continue under

this constitution until such time as the

general assembly shall,
repeal

the same'.

in

its

Setion 16, which is

the sane doctrine provides,-order or amend the charter
regulations

discretion,

"The

modify or

an extension of

general assembly may

of Olarksville,

and make such

as may be necessary for carrying

the objects contemplated

in

granting the sae

into effect
; and the

funds belonging to said town shall be applied according
to the intention of the grantors.*
(12) Constitution of Iowa,1857.

Art.VIIi, See.12,-

'The general assembly shall have power to mend or repeal all laws for the organization of,
corporat ions,
leges,

or creation of

or granting of' special or exclusive privi-

or ixununities

by a vote of two-thirds of each
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branch of the general assembly ; and no exclusive
except as in this article

leges,

privi-

provided shall ever be

granted.'R

(13) Constitution of' Arkansas,

1859. Art.XII,

See.l,

"The legislature shall pass no special act conferring
corporate powers.

Corporations may be created under

general laws ; but all

such alaws Tay be amendecL or

repealed.'
(14) The Constitution of Kentucky

of 1850 is silent

on the subject of the corporate franehise.

1868,

(15) The Constitution of Louisiana,

is also

silent on the revocation of a corporate franchise.
(16)

The Constitution of Mlaine,

on the question of corporations.
to that

vides, -laws,

instrument in 1876,

'Corporations

is

1820,

also silent

But in the amendment

Article IV,

Section 14.,

pro-

shall be formed urder general

and shall not be created 1)y special acts of the

legislature,

except for mUnicipal purposes,

and in

eases

where the objects of the corporation cannot otherwise
be attained ; and however forfmed they shall forever be
subject to the general laws of the state'.
(17)

Constitution of M.,aryland,

1867.

Art. III,

provides,-- "All charters granted (to corporations)

See.48,
and
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0

.

,

.

heretofore granted and areated subject to re-

peal or modification, may be altered, from time to time,
or repealed ; provided, nothing herein eontained shall
be construed to extend to banks or the incorporation
thereof.'
(18) Constitution of Massachusetts,1780. In the
Constitution of Maessahusetts the subject of corporations
is

but once mentioned, and then to the effect that no

corporation or man has either advantage or privilege !
distinct from those of the commnity.
(19)Constitution of Miahigan,1850. Amendment to
Article XV,

Section 1, "Corporations may be formed under

general laws, but shall not be created by special act,
except for municipal purposes.
to this section may be amended,

All laws passed puraant
altered, or repealed'.

(20) Constitution of Minnesota,1857.

In its

see-

tion devoted to corporations the Constitution of Minnesota says nothing about the power of the legislature
to revoke a charter,
after it

or to alter or change such charter

has been granted.

(21) Constitution of

Mississippi,

This document

says nothing about the power of the legislature to alter
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or revise a corporate charter once granted, except as
provided in Article XIT, Section 17,-"Liabilities of
corporations shrili be secured by legislative enactnent'.
(22) Constitution of > issouri,l875. Art.XII,Sec.3,
'The general assembly shall not remit the forfeiturc

of

the charter of any corporation now existing, or alter,
or amend such forfeited charter, or pass any other general or special laws for the benefit of such corporation',
(23) Constitution of" Nebraska, 1875v Art.XISeo,7,'The le,:.islature shall

pass laws to prevent abuses mid

prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in all
charges of express, telegraph, and railroad companies in
this state

; and enforce such laws by adequate penalties,

to the extent if necessary for that purpose of forfeiture
of their property and franchises".
(24) Constitution of Nevada,1864. Art.VIII, See.l,0-'Corporations may be formed uncer general laws, and all
such laws m1y from time to time be altered or repealed'.

Section 4 provides, --

mCorporations

created by or unlder

the laws of the territory of Nevada shall be suibjeet to
the provision of such laws until the legislature shall
pass laws regulat ing the s:-rne in pursuance of the pro-
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vision& of this constitution.'
(25)

Constitution of New Hampshire,

Rights, Art.
arrested,

XV provides,--

imprisoned,

1792.

Bill of

no subject shall be

'That

or deprived of his

despoiled,

property, inmunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law,

exiled or deprived of his life,

liberty,

but by judgment of his peers or the

or estate,

law of the land.*

This point is argued by Mr.MWson in

his brief before the New Hampshire court at considerable
length.

That part of the brief devoted to this point

covers some ten pages in Farrar's Report of the famous
trial.

As corporations are a creation of the later

statutes, there

is

silent on the subject

Article IV,

the early constitutions

in

The charter of New Hampshire,

regarding them.
is

but little

of corporations.

Section 11 says,-- 'Corporate

every nature obtained shall

.

.

.

.

.

1792,

Amendnent to
powers of

be subject to re-

peal or alteration at the will of the legislature'.
(26)

Constitution of North Carolina,

Se .-.

.

.

1868.

Art.VIII,

all general laws and special acts

passed pursuant to this section nay be altered, from
time to time,
tion ot'

or repealed.'

Amendment to the Constitu-

North Carolina, 1876,

Article VIII,

Sec.1,--
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'All general laws ana special acts passed pursuant to
this section may be altered from time to time or repealed.'0
(27) Constitution of Ohio, 1851. Art. XVII, Sec. 2,.'Corporations may be formed under general laws ; but all
such laws may from time to time be altered or repealed.'
(28)

Constitution of Oregon,

porations,

See.

2,--"All

section may be altered,

1857. Art.

XI, Cor-

laws passed pursuant to this
amended,

or repealed,

but not

so as to impair or destroy any vested corporate rights,"
(29)

Constitution of Pennsylvania,

Corporations, Se.

10,--

have the power to alter,
incorporation

'The

1873. Art.

XVI,

general assembly shall

revoke,

or amend any charter of

now existing and revocable at the adoption

of this constitution, or any that may hereafter be
created,

whenever in their opinion it

may be injurious

to the citizens of this commonwealth ; in such manner
however,

that no injustice shall be done to the corpora-

tore'.
($0)

Constitution of Rhode Island,

1842 says

nothing about the revoking or revising of charters by
the legislative

power.

(51) Constitution of South Carolina,

1868.

Art.XI,
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Corporations,

See.

1,

--

"Corporations may be formed

under the general laws ; but all mieh laws may from
time to time be altered or repealed'.
(32) Constitution of Tennessee, 1870.
See.

8,--

Art. XI,

*The general assembly shall provide by general

laws for the organization of all corporations hereafter
created which laws may at any time be altered or repealed ; and no such alteration or repeal shall interfere with or divest rights whioh have boeene vested.*
(33) Constitution of Texas,
Corporations,

See.

regulate freights,

3,-- 'The

1876.

Art. X11,

Private

right to authorize and

tolls, fares

.

.

.

.

relinquished or abandoned by the state,

shall never be
but shall always

be under legislative control, and depend upon legislative
authority.'
(34) Constitution of Vermont,
ments down to 1870,

1793 and the Amend-

are silent as to the legislative

power to revoke a corporate eharter.

Constitution of

Vermont of 1777 provides that-the legislature may grant
chart ers of incorporation.
(35) Constitution of Virginia, 1870 is also silent
on the power

of the legislature to revoke or arrand a
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corporate charter.

It

provides for power to tax cor-

porations the same as other property.
(36)
See.
#

.

Constitution of West Virginia,

1872.

Art.IX,

5,-- *No charter of incorporation shall be granted
.

. unless the right be reserved to alter or amend

such charter at the pleasure of the legislature to be
declared by general laws.'
(37) Constitution of Wisconsin,
porations,

says,-- "All general laws,

1848. Art.

XI,

Cor-

or special acts

enacted under the provisions of this section way be
altered or repealed by the legislature at any tire after
their passage'.
(38) Constitution of North Dakota,
Corporations,

Sec.t3--

,

.

1889.

Art.VIII,

.any laws so passed (ac-

cording to this section) shall be subject to future
repeal or alteration."
(39) Constitution of South Dakota, 1889. Art.XVII,

Sec.

9,-- 'The

legislature shall have power to alter,

revise or amerxd any charter of any corporation now
existing and revocable at the taking effect of this constitution, or any that may be created

.

.

.

.

in

such a

rranner that no injustice shall be done to the inicorpora-

tors.'0
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(40)

Constitution of Montana, 1889. Art.XV, Cor-

porations,

Sea.

such laws shall be subj ect to

2,--'Any

future repeal, or alteration by the legislative assembly!
(41)

Constitution of Washington,

Corporations,

Sec.

1,--

tions may be altered,

1889,

Article XII,

*All laws relating to corpora-

amended,

or repealed by the legis-

lature at any time,

and all corporations doing business

in

as

this state

limited,

to such businessbe

regulated,

or restrained by law.'

(42)
tions,

may,

Constitution of Idaho,

a, --

See.

'.

..

1889.

Art.

XI,

Corpora-

Any such general law shall be

subject to future repeal or alteration by the legislature.'
(43)

Constitution of Wyoming,

porations,

See.

may be altered,
at any tirm

1,--

'All

amended,

1889.

Art.

X,

laws relating to corporations
or repealed by the legislature

when necessary for the public good,

general welfare,

and all

Cor-

and

corporations doini business in

this state may as to such business be regulated,

limited,

or restrained by laws not in conflict with the Con stitution of the United States.'U

48
(44)

The Qonstitution6 of New Jersey are all silent,

containing not a word on the subject of corporations.
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CHAPTER VI.
FRANCHISES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS.

Having traced the provisions of the diffierent state
constitutions regarding the corporate franchise,
now turn briefly aside to look at
meaning of this term.

What is

we will

the more particular

a franchise, and what is

the principle umderneath all which has restricted the
legislature

in the revocation of this privilege

A franchise is
law.

It

is

is

essential

a right or privilege conferred by

a special privilege conferred by government

upon individuals,
citizens of

F

ano, which does not belong to the

the country generally,

of comwon right.

to the character of a franchise,

It

that it

should be a grant from the sovereign authority, and in
this country no franchise can be held which i
rived from a law of the state.
ture grants a charter

not de-

Thus when the legisla-

of incorporation,

it

confers upon

the grantees the rights of forming a corporation,
of acting within certain prescribed limits.

It

and
is

con-

ferred upon the individual grantees,together with such
other persons as uay become members of the associat ion
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or by the ereation of new

either by transfer of shares,

shares which the legislature has authorized the company
Carters sometimes confer powers to take pri-

to issue.

but most of the contitu-

vate property for public use,
tions of' the states provide,

that no corporation shall

take private property for public use without the due
Compensation required under the Constitution of the
United State s.

1

Article I,

Sec.

States provides that,
bill of attainder, e

10 of the Constitution of the United
--m'No state shafl

fjo

law,

.

.

.

pass any

or law impairing

A state eonstItution

the obligations of contracts'.
adopted by a vote of the people is

a law within this

prohibition.2
The XIV Amendment of the. Constitution provides that
no state 'shall deprive any person of life,
property without due process of law,
son within its jurisdiction,

liberty or

or deny to any per-

the equal protection of the

laws' .
The V Amendment,
Government,

limiting the power of' the Federal

provides that no person shall 'be deprived

(1) Railroad Company v.
(2)

MceClure,

Morawetz on Corporations.

10 Wallace,5ll,
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of life, liberty, or property without due process of' law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation".

Similar provisions in the

constitutions of the several states limit the powers of
the state legislatures.
All these provisions are designed to enforce a
generz-l principle of right which lies at the foundation
of all political liberty.
have a natural,

The principle is that all men

and inherent right to life, liberty, and

property ; or life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

To secure these rights governments are instituted

artong men, and

any interference with inherent

rights can be justified only as a means of securing the
most fundamental rights, and then only at the demnarf of
public safety,

or public security.

A state is prohibited by the constitution from passing a law altering the purpose of a corporation,
out in the charter,

as set

because such a law would impair the

contract existing between the members oV the association.
Such a law would violate tho rights of each individual
share holder ; and the majority could not by their assent
dispose

is

of' the rights of the minority.

A l~iw such as

here mentioned would be unconstitutional,

because it
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would be without due process of law, and without due coM-

pensation. I

This point was dwelt upon by Mr. !vliason be-

fore the New Hampshire court in the Dartmouth College

case at great length.

His effort was to show that the

act of the New Hampshire legislature took away from the
corporation its invested funds, and put them in new
hands,-- namely,

the new Board of Trustees.

A law dissolving a corporation,

future transaction of its business,

or rendering the

and the performance

of the agreement of association illegal, would likewise
be unconstitutional irrespective of any contract between
the state and the corporators.
of a law,

The constitutionality

altering the charter of a charitable

institu-

tion, depends upon the eff ect of such a law upon the
funds of the institution.

The members of a purely

charitable corporation are not umited like the mmbers
of a business eompany.
tees,

Their duties are those of trus-

who are to administer the funds according to the

terms of the charter.
The term contract is used in the constitution in its
broadest sense.

2

(1) Sinking Funa
(2)

It applies to all contractual obliga-

Cases, 99 U.S.,

737.

Chief-Justice Marshall in his opinion in the Dartmouth College Case construes the word contract as
used in the Constitution in a more limited sense.
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tions whether they be called contracts in technical
phraseology or not.

as well as unexecuted agree-

Grants,

ments, trusts and comnon law areements are protected.

1

The doctrine that a grant of franchise by act of the
legislature, when accepted by the grantees, becomes a
contract within the pr-otection of the constitution of the
United States, implies that the legislature iraking the
grant had not only the intention, but also the power to
make a contract or treaty on behalf of the state that

the franchise shall be irrevocable.

It is well settled

by the higheet authority that such a power does exist to
a limited extent, unless it
the state constitution.

is expressly taken away by
It is also well settled that

each state has certain powers

which no legislature can

limit even in a particular case by a ccntract,
revocable grant of franchise.
powers.

It

or ir-

These are the police

is therefore in excess of the power delegat-

ed by the people to the legislature to abridge these
powers by contract,

or grant of franchises.

2

(1) Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S., 749.
(2) Stone v. Mississippi, l0l,U.S.,814.
Beer Oo.y.
Mass., 97 U.S., 33.
Boyd V. Alabara, 94 U.S.,
645.
Regents of Univ. v. Williams,9 3. & G.,36,
State v. Morris, 77 N.C., 512. Dinib-ian v.Peopl
51 III., 191.
Lake View v. Rose Yill Cemetery
Cc., 70 Ill., 191. State v.WoodwarO, 89 Ind.,lIiO.
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C APTER VI I.
SEqTJENCE FFATURES AS PORTRAYED IN LEADING CASES.

The sequence features of this case might
through a considerable period
ly brief like this it

be traced

; but in a work necessari-

seems best to look only at some

later phases of the aoctrine.

A glance at the cases

will readily show how far we have drifted on the stream
of legal data and of constitutional
the rule enunciated by Chief-Justice

controversy from
larshall more than

seventy-five years ago.
In

the case of Matthews v.

road Company,

24 S.W. Reporter,

The St.

591,

Louis & S.F.Rail-

an action was

brought by the plaintiff for damages caused by fire set
by sparks Irom a locomotive owned and operated by the
defendant.

In the answer to the complaint,

the defend-

ant averred that the act of the legislature making the
company an insurer was illegal, unconstitutional, and
void,

in

that

it

denies to the defendant

the equal pro-

tection of the laws contrary to the provisions of Article
XIV,

Section 1 of the amendments to t1e Constitution of

the United States ; and that it

deprives the defendant
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of his property without due process of law, contrarj to
the provisions of Article V of the amendnents of the
Constitution of the United States ; and in this thAt it
impairs the obligation of contracts made between the
staxe of Missouri and the defendant by the terms of which
it was impliedly agreed that said aefendant might and
could use fire for the purpose of generating steam to
propel locomotive engines and cars attached thereto, and
to be responsible for the negligent and careless use
thereof.
In the nmtter of the impairment of the obligation
of contracts the Supreme Court of Missouri, speaking
through Judge Gantt, denied that the statute did so Imapair the obligation of contracts, as set forth in the
Dartmouth College case.
vested rights.

It does not impair or revoke

The court says that the defendant's

charter is a contract with the state ; but that this
statutory regulation, requiring the ccmpany to take

the risk of an insurer, and so become responsible in
damages to every person and corporation whose property
may be injured or de stroyed by fire, oonunicated directly or indirectly by locorotive engines in use upon the
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railroad owned and operated by such railroad corpora-o
tions, does not imipair the obligation of such contract.
It

has often been held that

this clpuse of the Consti-

tution of the T.nited States does not so far

remove from

state control the ri,jits and properties which depend
for their existence,

or enforcement,

upon contracts as

to relieve them from the operation of such general regulations for the good government

of the

state, and

the

protection of the ri,(-hts of individuals as may be deemed
important.

All

to this power

contracts and all

; and all

to time be subject

rights are subj ect

such regulations nuist from time

to such change as the well being of

the eor-unity requires.
Therefore

if

the legislature regards it

to pass a law fixing the liability

necessary

of railroads for

fires kindled by their locomotives in

order to protect

the property of neighboring citizens,

there is

in

that can curtail

the state or Federal Constitutions

this power.

nothing

The state has and can have no higher

function than to care for and protect the property of
its citizens and their own safety.

All

laws and all

charters are p~issed subject to this duty whenever

it

rn~y
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arise.
The BingharIton Bridge Case,
is

3 Wallace,

51,

one that stancis on the rule laid down in the Dartmouth

College case.

ere the state had incorporated a

oompany to build a toll bridge, and to take tolls,
the sam act it

hao provided that it

In

should not be law-

ful for amAy person or persons to erect any bridge within
two miles either above or below that bridge.
statute is

held to mean,

This

not only that no person or asso-

ciat ion of persons shall erect such a briAge without
leSislative authority, but that the legislature itself
will not make it

lawful for any person or association of

persons to do so by giving them authority.
A subsequent act of the legislature,

granting a

charter to another bridge company who built a bridge a

few rods above the old one, was held void as impairing
the obligation of cautract.

The case of Dartmouth

College v. Woodward was cited and approved.
Chief-Justice Chase and Just ices Field and Grier
dissented from the opinion of i tr Justice Davis in
case.

M'r.

this

Justice Grier delivered the dissenting opin-

ion which seems somnct in its principles, and vigorous in

its clear-cut discrimination.
In Farrington v.

Tennessee, 95 United States, 679,

the charter of a bank, granted by the lejislature of
Tennessee, provides tiat tne bank, "shall pay to the
state an annual tax of one-half of one per cent. on each
share of the capital stock subscribed which shall be

in lieu of all other taxes!

The rule was laid down in

this case that the provision is a contract between the
state and the bank limiting the amount of tax to each
share of the stock ; and that a subsequent revenue law

of the state, imposing an additional tax on the shares
in the hanes of stockholders,

that contract and is void.
v.

Woodward is

impairs the obligation of

Case of Dartmouth College

cited and affirmed.

To this opinion of the

court Mr.

Justice

Stong with

whom concurred Justices Clifford and Field dissented.
"If
Says Mir.

there be any doctrine

founded in

Justice Stong,"and necessary to

continued existence of a state, it is

Justice",
the safety and

that all presump-.

tions are against the legislative intent to relinquish
the power of taxation over a species of property.'
Citing the Providence Eank v.

Billings, 4 Peters, 514,

in

support of this he quotes from the words of Chief-

Justice Marshall,
in

retaining

it

*As the whole comMunity is

interested

(the power to tax) undiminished,

comnunity has a right

to insist that

ought not to be presumed in

that

its abandonrrnt

a ease in which the deliber-

ate purpose of the state to abandon does not appear'.
Mr,

Justice Strong further cites in

position,

The Ohio Life &a. Company

2066

v. Debolt, 16

The Delaware Railroad Tax Case,

Howard, 416.
laee,

support of his

Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wallace, 573.

Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard,
v.

18 Wal-

the Conmissioners,

4 Wallace,

133.

People

244.

In the ease of the Citizens Street Railway Company
v.

The City Railway Company,

the question as to what is

56 Yederal

Reporter,

746,

a contract under the clause

of the Constitution of the United States forbidding the
impairing of the obligation of contraete is
In

this case it

pursuance

taken up.

was held that city ordinances,

made in

of law and granting to a corporation the right

to build and operate Street Railway lines in the city
after acceptance by the corporation,

and the expenditure

of large sums of zroney on the faith thereof,

constitute
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a contract protected by the Constitution of the United
Stat es.
In March,

The case is this.

1891,

the leglsla-w

ture of Indiana passed a law conferring upon the city of
Indianapolis

the power,

when approved by

by contract,

the ordinance of the Common Council,
to Street Railroad Companies.

to grant franehises

The Board of Public

Works accordingly exercised this power with the aproval
of the Com.on Council,

and conferred upon a new company

the right to operate and construot a street railway.
The old company which lad now been in operation some
years,

brought suit against the new company.

filed bill to have complaint dismissed,

Defendant

The

act of the

Common Council was held to be a law within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United States, Article I,
Seetion 10.
Now the complainant in this case,

a corporation)

had derived its rights under ordiranoes of the city of
Indianapolis adopted pursuant to law in the years 1864,
1865, 1880,

1888,

and 1889.

These ordinances expressly

provided that 'the said city of Indianapolis shall not
during all the time to which the privilegs

hereby grant-
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ed to said company shall extend,

grant to,

or confer upon

any person or corporation any privilege which will impair
or destroy the rights and privileges herein granted to
The act was clearly an infringement

said company."

upon a vested right,

was about to suffer great

dvnages.

held that the grant of rights,
to the complainant,
expenditure

of large

or

as the plaintiff had suffered,

The court accordingly

privileges,

and imnnities

coupled with the acceptance and the
sums of money on faith thereof was

a contract under the protection of" the Constitution of
the United States.

The motion of the defendant to

dismiss the complaint was accordingly overruled.
In

panies,

Commonwealth v.

Owensboro et al.

23 S.W. Reporter,

that an act,

passed in

868,

1856,

Railroad Com-

the rule is laid down

reserving to the legisla-

ture the right to repeal or amend charter privileges,
granted by the legislature to particular persons,
not enable

the legislature

does

to repeal the act of 1884.,

exempting railroads from taxation for a space of five
years-- since it

is clearly a case of impairment of a

contrac t obli gat ion.

Quoting from Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wallace,

454,

--
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a leading case on the subject,
ty from taxation,

the court says,- -'lmmuni-

constituting in these cases a part of
is

the contract with the government,
of the power,

by the reservation

Suah as is contained in the law of 1856,

subject to be revoked equally with any other provision
of the charter whenever the legislature may deem it

ex-

pedient for the public interest that the revocation shall
be niade.

But the court goes on to say that if

this

proposition were applied to the persons who had accepted
the offer of the state to exempt from taxation certain
had on the strength of the

property for five years, and

promise of the state acquired rights and interests,
had invested money in this

enterprise,

it

and

would be un-

Upon the adoption of

just in an extraordinary degree.

the act of exemption from taxation, no contract was made
with any person, natural or artifioial, though by accepting its terms certain rights might be secured thereunder
of the nature of contract rights.
express or implied,

can be

But no reservation,

aid to have been made therein

by virtue of the act o±f 1856.

The law is

general,

therefore revocable at pleasure ; but from this it
not follow

that it

and
does

might be revoked so as to injuriously
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in viola-

affect the citizens accepting its provision,

tion of the pledge of the state and the cornmon principles
of Justice.

To promote the ends of development,

afford greater facilities
bring into

for transportation,

and to

borders an increased volume of property

its

shortly to help bear the commron tax burden,
says to the railroad people,--

of your effort,

the state

Expend your capital and

build up your enterprises arm.ong us,

and in

consideration

we will give you a brief respite from

the burdens of taxation.'
its

to

The state cannot withdraw

pledge of immunity from those

who acted upon the

assurances of this act.
In the case of the

Manhattan Trust Company v.

The City of Dayton, 59 Federal Reporter, 327, the question as to whether a provision of the Common Council,
fixing the maximum price of gas,

is

a contract,

or an

exercise of' the power to regulate, and a limitation on
the license granted,
the case was,

is

raised.

The rule laid down

that when a municipal council is

in

authorized

by statute to contract for a period not exceeding ten
years,

its contract for twenty years,

or for an in~2fi-

nite time cannot be sustained as a contract for ten years,
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but is

entirely voids

Under a statute

empowering municipal councils to

regulate from time to time the price of gas,

and authori-

izing them to bind themselves by contract not to reduce
the price below an agreed minimum for

ten years,

a

council contracted for r.rinimum schedule rates by vmixure
measure" for five years.
nance providing in

Afterwards it

one section that consurLirs might elect

to have gas furnished by meter,
schedule

rates,

passed an ordi-

instead of at the

in which case a maximum price was fixed

without any limitation of time.

A subsequent

seetion

declared that the contract before made should continue
in

force,

'except

time thereof.

It

as herein altered',
was held that

maximum price was not a contract,
and therefore alterable at
We find, therefore,
the Dartmouth
and restricted.

for the unexpired

the provision for a
but a regulation,

pleasure.

that the law as laid down in

College case has been somewhat changed
The constitutions of the states haVe

in almost all cases asserted their authority to repeal,
alter,
please,

revoke,

or amend,

all charters

in whatsoever way they may

ranted to corporations.

As the
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constitution is law, and as all persons know the law,
the @onstitution is therefore a part of the charter and
so of the contract.

The changes made by the legisla-

ture are, of course, to be within the bounds of the constitution of the United States (Article I, See. 10) prohibiting any law impairing the obligation of
and the disruption of vested rights.

contracts,

In most of those

states where the constitutions are silent, as to the
power of the legislature to alter or revoke a charter,
the statutes confer this power.

This is the ease in

Massachusetts, while in other states the power is both
statutory and oonstitutional.A

This virtually elimin-

ates the contrast feature from the charter of a corporation, so far as the United States Constitution is concerned, and leaves that charter at the caprice of the
legislature.

This is no doubt the correct theory as is

shown in some of the dissenting opinions cited in this
chapter, (Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S., 679) since
the State is of more value than any corporation.
E~ut to define what is a contract, and what
under the

United

i8

a law,

tates Constitution, are still matters

(1) Stimson's American Statute Law.
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a railroad

making

We have found that a law

of legal controversy.

company an insurer for all damages arising

from fire set by its locomotives does not impair a con(Matkhews v.

tract obligation.
road Company,

24 S.W.

Reporter,

The St.

Louis & S.r1.Rail-

591).

Again where the

state incorporates a company to exclusively carry on

certain business,

and subsequently grants to another

company power to do a like business,
impair a contract obligation.

3 Wallace, 51.)

it

is

held to

(The Binghamton Bridge Casq

So a promise of the state to tax

a corporation a certain per Cent.

and no more is

a

contract, and a subsequent revenue law imposing an extra
burden is void.
Railroad Companies,

(Cormvonwealth v.Owensboro et al.
23 S.W.

Reporter,

868.)

Again a city ordinance passed by the consent of the
legislature is held a law, and as it impaired the obligation of a former contract of the corporation with the
state, it also is

void.

(Citizens Street Railway Com-

pany v. The City Railw'ay Company,
746.)

And lastly,

56 5 ederal Reporter,

a provision oZ7 a city's Co, non

Council, miakir< a certain ajreemont under statutory

authority with the citixens of the city,

vas altered

80
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as to give the citizens a choice of two methods of carry-

ing out the original contract.

The former contract was

by the terms of the new agreement said to be in force
except Nas herein altered".
vision was held not a law,
Common Council,

This alteration of the probut a regulation of the

and theefore not under the prohibitory

clause of the Constitution of the United States.
tan Trust Company v.
porter, 627,)

The City of Dajton,

(anhat-

59 F 'e leral.Re-
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CHAPTER VIII.
A NOVEL FEATIUE IN THE NEW YORK STATUTES.

An interesting and novel feature of the power of
franchise lately

the legislature to revoke a corporate
occurred in New York State.

It is in sabstance this

In 1890 the legislature repealed the clause
Ch.18,Title IIISec.8, Revised Statutes,

of Part I,

which reads thus,

"The charter of every corporation that shall hereafter
be granted by the legislature,

shall be subject to alter-

ation, suspension, an. repeal, in the discretion of the
legislature.

This section was repealed upon the sup-

position that substantially the same groumd was covered
by the clause of the New York Constitution of 1846,

provides that,--"All

which

general laws and special acts pass-

ed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to
time or repealed'--

(Art.

VII,

Sec.

1 Const.

The legislature has since found itself in
ficulty.

N. Y.).
this dif-

Those corporations which had received their

charters previous to the adoption of the constitution of

1846

were formed under the statute here repealed,

and
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could not therefore
constitutional

be brought within the power of the

clause.

The previous constitution of

1821 contains no word on the subject of corporations
so that upon the repeal of the statute,
tions were given the rights,

powers,

these corpora-

and privileges ap-

purtenant to corporations under the old
Dartmouth College case.

;

doctrine

of the

Their chartes were therefore

irrevocable, unalterable, and perpetual, and are protected by Art. I,

See. 10 of the Constitution of the

United States as contracts,

and the state can pass no law

impairing their obligations.
But cannot the' state re-enact ?

Is

it

impossible to

incorporate into the statutes the clause that was repealed ?

Here we have another interesting and novel

feature.

To do this the state must pass a law that is

to reach back to the time of the repeal,
time not be retro-active
contracts,

anv, at the same

as impairing the obligation of

or disturbing vested rights,

It

is

as if

the

State qnd the Corporation had entered into a contract.

After its consurrmnation the State says to the Corporation
"I will relinquish my rights under a certain clause of
our contract.

We will therefore strike this clause out
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of our agreement.'
its

mistake,

At a l:'ter period,

the state seeing

comes to the corporation with,--

"I

wish to

reinstate into our contract the clause stricken out
The corporation,

some time ago."
its

unwilling to relinquish

power, meets this request with the argunent that it

has acquired vested rights under the charter,
for

proposes to throw itself

privilege,

and tivre-

on its constitutional

and set up Article

I,

Sec.

10 of the United

States Constitution together with the Dartmouth College
case as a defense.
The state is
the law,

now in

a dilermma.

If it re-enacts

the corporation sets up its

rights and privileges.

If

poration unrestrained,

and it

self dominion and power.
on the subject,

it

constitutional

does not we have the eorgoes on gathering to it-

There has been no

so far as I can find,

litigation

but a suit on this

feature of the law would be of vital importance and
would revive a dramatic moment
pora te franc hise.

in

the laws of the cor-
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